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Following the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, international development policy 
discourses have focused on partnership as an overarching principle. With a focus on 
participation and non-hierarchical relationships, new partnerships aim to reconstitute the aid 
relationship in a way that obviates power inequality and hegemony. However, empirical 
studies of these partnerships are scarce. This paper uses social network analysis to analyse 
relationships between organisations involved in prominent partnerships for education in 
international development. Our analysis of an original dataset demonstrates that bilateral 
donors, civil society organisations and international organisations are most likely to occupy 
central positions in this network, meaning that they enjoy high levels of connectivity to many 
organisations. Literature on international networks suggests that these organisations would 
therefore shape the flow of information and ideas between organisations, influence the 
distribution of resources among members, and determine normative preferences of the 
partnerships. In contrast, recipient governments, private businesses and universities occupy 
peripheral positions. We contextualise these findings with respect to literature on aid in 
international education and privatisation in the political economy of educational 
development. 
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The number of organisations participating in international development has proliferated 
rapidly, expanding from its origins in relations between states and international financial 
institutions, to an increasing role for civil society organisations (CSOs), private businesses, 
philanthropies, and academia. This surge in the participation of different types of actors has 
coincided with a shift in contemporary international development rhetoric. Following the 
2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, development policy discourses have centred on 
partnership as an overarching principle. With a focus on participation and non-hierarchical 
relationships, new partnerships aim to reconstitute the aid relationship in a way that obviates 
power inequality and hegemony (Colclough and Webb, 2012; Klees 2010; Varvus and 
Seghers 2010; Verger et al. 2014). However, the extent to which these discursive and 
organisational shifts ameliorate longstanding critiques about power inequalities in 
international development remains an open question.  
In this paper, we seek to better understand power relationships between organisations 
involved in international educational development using social network analysis. Looking at 
networks of co-membership in seven prominent international education partnerships, we map 
relations between different types of actors and examine patterns of relationships between 
them. We examine how power operates by looking at positionality within the network, 
determining the extent to which centrality and brokerage differ across organisations from the 
Global South and North. 
We begin with a review of contextual literature on the shift to partnership-based 
organisations in global education and theoretical perspectives on networks in international 
relations. We then describe our data and methods, focusing on the measurements of centrality 
and brokerage. Our analysis begins with an overview of the network structure and then 
presents tests of how centrality and brokerage differ across different types of organisations 
and between those in the Global North and South. Our analysis of an original dataset 
demonstrates that bilateral donors, civil society organisations and international organisations 
are most likely to occupy central positions in this network, meaning that they enjoy high 
levels of connectivity to many organisations. Literature on international networks suggests 
that these organisations would therefore shape the flow of information and ideas between 
organisations, influence the distribution of resources among members, and determine 
normative preferences of the partnerships. In contrast, recipient governments, private 
businesses, and universities occupy peripheral positions. We contextualise these findings with 
respect to literature on aid to international education and privatisation in the political 
economy of educational development. 
The shift to partnership in global development 
Recent years have witnessed both a remarkable surge in the number of organisations 
participating in international development as well as a transformation in the types of actors 
engaging in the global policy environment. From its advent in the mid-twentieth century, 
international development assistance was primarily bilateral in nature —high-income donors 
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loaned or gave aid to a poorer recipient. Alongside bilateral aid, and to a slightly lesser 
degree, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank pooled donor funds and distributed 
resources to recipient countries in need of support to an array of sectors (Brown 2012). 
Although a small number of charities operated throughout the Global South, development 
was primarily a state-based activity.  
However, this model of development was widely criticised as fragmented, uncoordinated, and 
inefficient. Moreover, there was a growing realization that in an era of globalisation, states 
were failing to respond to problems with global impacts, in terms of financing, advocacy and 
policy-design. Finally, and most notably, the aid architecture was widely critiqued for 
excluding voices from the Global South, where recipients of aid were not sufficiently 
involved in the development processes that directly impact them (Benzanon and Isenman 
2012; Severino and Ray 2010; Stone 2004; 2013). Recognition of these shortcomings ushered 
in a new era of international development and ‘a fundamental reconstitution of the global 
public domain’ (Ruggie 2004, 2). 
This new global public domain necessitated new governance and aid arrangements. A series 
of global agreements, most notably in the 2005 Paris Declaration, set out to formally overhaul 
the aid agenda to include the need for increased partnership and coordination (OECD, 2005). 
The past decade has accordingly seen a rise in transnational partnerships—heterogeneous 
groups of both state and non-state actors—that aim to significantly influence decision-making 
on international development policy and funding at the global level (Savedoff 2012; Severino 
and Ray 2010; Stone 2013). These partnerships are envisaged as serving a range of functions, 
including resource pooling and distribution, coordination of activities, policy design, and 
advocacy (Backstrand 2008; Benzanon and Isenman 2012; Martens 2007). They are generally 
characterized by the inclusion of a diversity of actors, representing governments from both 
the Global North and South, multilateral agencies, private corporations, non-profit 
foundations, and civil society, enabling a ‘space of assembly’ where a range of actors can 
participate in decision-making (Stone 2013). 
Another key characteristic of partnerships is ‘an emphasis on non-hierarchical modes of 
steering,’ where partners are ostensibly considered equal (Risse 2004, 292). At their core is 
the strengthening and rearrangement of relationships, in particular between actors in the 
Global North and Global South. The rhetoric surrounding such organisations is dominated by 
concepts that reflect the positive potential of strong relationships, including ‘coordination,’ 
‘collaboration,’ and, most notably, ‘partnership’ (Draxler 2008; Klees 2010). Intertwined 
with the partnership rhetoric is the discourse of participation, indicating the desire for 
recipients of aid to more strongly and explicitly engage in the design of the policies that 
directly impact them. Countries in the Global South are aspirationally envisioned as having 
equal input into the development process via partnership arrangements (Backstrand 2006; 
Benzanon and Isenman 2012).   
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Partnerships are proliferating in many sectors of international aid in what Severino and Ray 
(2010) describe as ‘hypercollective’ action. Many of these partnerships have been established 
within in the past decade and have been designed to tackle significant issues (Backstrand 
2006; Bezanon and Isenman 2012; Stone 2013), for example the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Malaria; GAVI: The Vaccine Alliance; and the Global Water Partnership. 
The education sector has seen a notable rise in partnerships, where actors and organisations 
concerned with the provision of quality education worldwide have established partnerships 
that range in size and purpose. This trend can be traced to the 1990s with the World Congress 
on Education for All (EFA), one of the early collaborative efforts to support universal access 
to education. EFA signified a new consensus around global education norms, widely viewed 
as a new global compact on education (Mundy 2012; Sperling 2008). This compact also 
underpinned the second Millennium Development Goal towards universal primary education, 
supported by a range of organisations (Chabbott 2003; Mundy 2012). The combination of a 
new global educational compact and the belief that partnership is a means to more effective, 
equitable aid, has led to the establishment of several new collaborative educational 
organisations. These educational partnerships are interconnected via interlinking co-
memberships: many organisations are members of multiple partnerships. These 
interconnections resulting from co-memberships entail differing levels of connectivity 
between organisations. 
Education scholars have begun to examine the changing nature of global education and the 
proliferation of actors involved by identifying networks, most notably amongst non-state 
actors (Ball 2012; Mundy et al 2016; Verger 2012), and within single partnership 
organisations (Faul 2016).  What is less understood is how partnership organisations—
networks on their own—form a wider network in global education through co-membership. 
Moreover, partnership-based organisations are ostensibly presented as non-hierarchical, and 
therefore reflective of equal partnership (see Global Fund 2011; GPE 2013). Mosse (2006, 1) 
describes this era in international development, characterized by an emphasis on partnership 
and Southern participation, as the ‘moral resurrection of aid’ and underpinned by a re-
constitution of power arrangements. However, several scholars have noted that power 
imbalances do indeed exist within—and may in fact be augmented by—these partnership 
structures (Backstrand 2006; Faul 2016; Kahler 2009; Mosse 2006; Stone 2004). Through 
mapping the network formed by cross-organisational membership, we aim to understand its 
characteristics, and explore how power is constituted. 
Networks in international relations 
The study of networks in international relations is a relatively recent area of scholarship, and 
arose in response to perceived shortcomings of traditional analyses of international actors 
(Finnemore 2014; Hafner-Burton, Khaler, and Montgomery 2009; Moaz 2003; Kahler 2009). 
Historically, studies into the nature of inter-state relationships assumed particular hierarchies 
and structures, based mainly on material resources or military clout. A network approach 
offers an alternative perspective and ‘defines structures as emergent properties of persistent 
patterns of relations among agents that can define, enable, and constrain those agents’ 
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(Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009, 562). The network perspective emphasises the complex 
connectivity between actors over the intrinsic characteristics of actors themselves; as 
Goddard (2009, 254) explains: ‘for network theorists it is not actors’ interests, power, or 
ideology, but the relations among actors that are causally significant.’ Through examining the 
structure of relationships, network analysis has shown that the structure of international 
relations can be understood as a complex system in which actors’ positions are constructed 
through relational processes, not solely through individual characteristics (Finnemore 2014; 
Goddard 2009; Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Hughes 2009; Ward 2011).  
Key literature using network analysis to study international relations have naturally focused 
on inter-governmental organisations, such as the United Nations, European Union, or World 
Bank, as their units of analysis (Beckfield 2008; Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Torfason and 
Ingram 2010). Other studies have looked at the rise of transnational advocacy networks of 
international non-governmental organisations (Beckfield 2003; Finnemore and Sikkink 1999; 
Hughes, et al. 2009; Smith and Wiest 2005). A number of thematic areas have been targeted 
to help understand the structure and hierarchies within such networks, including patterns of 
conflict and alliances, such as arms trading and nuclear proliferation treaties (Hafner-Burton 
and Montgomery 2006; Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009; Kahler 2009); policy entrepreneurship 
within networks (Goddard 2009); the diffusion of democracy (Torfason and Ingram 2010); 
and changes to international networks over time (Beckfield 2008; 2010; Moaz, et al. 2003). 
On the more specific topic of global education, scholars have studied tertiary school 
expansion and international networks of universities (Shields 2013, 2016; Clark 2008). 
Although a there is some literature on the networks that are represented within single 
partnerships (i.e. Faul 2016), no known studies have examined the interconnections between 
actors working in education through the analysis of the network arising from cross-
membership to several partnership-based organisations. Few studies have attempted to 
capture the interconnectedness of the diverse array actors that are now populating the 
development landscape, including country governments, multilateral agencies, civil society, 
religious organisations, private foundations, private corporations, think tanks, and so forth.   
Our study looks at the rise of partnership-based organisations as a means to critically analyse 
the shift towards ‘partnership’ in international aid to education. It maps ‘hypercollectivity’ in 
a single issue area and examines how power is distributed among different types of actors 
within this network. The network perspective is particularly useful in this investigation for 
two key reasons. First, given the vast proliferation of actors involved in the international 
development arena and the growth in partnerships, a network approach can give a deep 
description to help track and expose both complexity and size (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009). A 
network analysis can help in illuminating the characteristics and scope of the international 
network of actors involved in educational development.  
Second, network analysts in international relations claim that only through a deeper 
examination of relationships between actors participating as members can we understand if 
these partnerships reflect the equality that they propose to enable (Hafner-Burton and 
Montgomery 2006; Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009). As Finnemore argues, network analysis is 
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important because ‘the participatory nature of partnerships has often been criticized as more 
symbolic than substantive and, as with many governing efforts, outcomes have been mixed’ 
(Finnemore 2014, 223). Although scholars have provided analyses based on counts of 
membership in organisations, some have argued that without addressing relationships via a 
network approach, ‘the extent of inequality… may be understated’ (Beckfield 2008, 423).  
Not only is knowing the number of connections between actors important, but also significant 
is understanding the structure that ties them to each other, which may expose power 
imbalances (Beckfield 2008). 
Conceptualizing power in international networks 
The study of international relations and development has conceptualized power in a variety of 
ways, focusing not only on the traditional notions of asymmetries between states in military 
strength or resources, but also on the influence of information, ideas, or ‘soft’ power, such as 
culture and religion (Finnemore and Sikkink 1999; Keohane 2006; Nye 2004). Referencing 
the current era of global governance, characterized by partnership and coordination, 
Finnemore argues that it is not solely actors, but relationships that ought to be our units of 
analysis in the study of power in international development (Finnemore 2014, 223). Barnett 
and Duvall’s ‘taxonomy of power’ framework delineates the different forms of power that are 
observable in international relations, focusing on types of interactions between actors (2005). 
Many scholars who study power in the international system draw from Foucault, who argues: 
‘What characterizes the power we are analysing is that it brings into play relations between 
individuals (or between groups). For let us not deceive ourselves; if we speak of the 
structures or the mechanisms of power, it is only insofar as we suppose that certain persons 
exercise power over others. The term “power” designates relationships between partners’ 
(Foucault 1982, 786). 
Such conceptions of power, all attuned to the significance of relationships and the nature of 
connections between actors, are complemented by network analysis. A network approach can 
bring to light power hierarchies in a variety of ways. Power is dependent not only on an 
actor’s characteristics, but its location within the network structure. As Hughes and 
colleagues explain: ‘Network analysis reveals how power is a function of the cohesiveness of 
groups within a given network’ and ‘structures opportunity and exchange within networks’ 
(Hughes, et al. 2009, 1717). For instance, an actor that has a high degree centrality measure, 
meaning many strong links to other organisations, is likely to be relatively powerful because 
it can benefit from increased access to resources from other actors (Hafner-Burton et al. 
2009; Beckfield 2008). Discussing an actor as a ‘node’ within the network, Hafner-Burton et 
al (2009, 570) note how centrality can moreover ‘shape the flow of information among nodes 
and alter common understandings of relative capabilities, common interests, or norms’ 
(Hafner-Burton et al. 2009, 570). 
Power can also be illuminated through a network analysis by identifying ‘network brokers’ 
who act as political entrepreneurs in having exclusive ties to different types of actors that 
would otherwise not be connected. In acting as their sole link, the broker holds power 
through its ‘betweenness’ and ability to control flows of information and resources. Actors 
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that are marginal within the network are therefore dependent on these brokers (Hafner-
Burton, et al. 2009; Goddard 2009). 
Even those within a network that might on surface appear to lack influence because of low 
degree centrality, may in fact have power due to their ‘exit option’ where some actors have 
an ability to easily leave the network. Those nodes which may seem peripheral to the network 
have the power to ‘de-link’ where ‘strategic efforts within the network to exploit bargaining 
power may result in threats of exit by those who are its targets’ (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009, 
571). Those marginal nodes that are not dependent on others in the network, which perhaps 
have ample resources, or can benefit equally from engaging in options outside the network, 
therefore wield the power to exit. Understanding the characteristics of such nodes and their 
history of relationships within and outside of the network helps to identify them as peripheral, 
yet powerful.  
Several scholars have pointed to the benefit of a network approach to contrast some existing 
assumptions about partnership arrangements as equalizing (Beckfield 2008; Faul 2016; 
Hughes, et al. 2009). In fact, network analysis can expose how networks may augment power 
differentials: ‘network power may also be self-reinforcing and ultimately deepen other 
inequalities in the international system’ (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009, 574). In educational aid, 
the key power imbalance has historically been between the Global North and South, where 
the recipients of aid have been subjugated to the conditions of their Northern funders. Early 
critiques of international development theorized this power relationship as one of material 
dependency, in which power asymmetries were rooted in historical capital accumulation in 
the North and its ability to command low-cost labour in the South (Presbich 1950; Singer 
1950; Wallerstein 1974). The advent of post-structuralist critiques (Said 1978) developed this 
account to include the discursive power of Northern countries in setting the epistemic norms 
and premises on which the development relationship was founded (Escobar 1994; Ferguson 
1990). While differing in their conceptualisation of power, these perspectives expect 
persistent power imbalances between the North and South that are concealed under 
ideological guise of apolitical or consensual relationships (Ferguson 1990). These 
expectations translate well to a network perspective, which envisages ‘the global network as 
stratified, built on an existing foundation of inequality in the distribution of power and 
influence’ (Hughes 2009, 1712). The study of centrality of actors corresponds well to the 
‘core’ and ‘periphery’ categories established in dependency and world-systems analysis 
(Clark 2008), as well as the ability to establish norms and control information as a form of 
discursive power. 
Synopsis of the literature 
Our review of the literature identifies a shift towards partnership as an organising principle in 
international development. In the education sector, the growth of partnerships holds the 
potential to substantially alter the types of actors participating in policy and funding 
decisions. One key area for investigation is therefore to map and explore the range of actors 
engaged in partnerships in international development education. In this respect, we seek to 
identify the types of actors, their proportional representation in the network, and their 
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geographic distribution. 
Literature on international networks demonstrates how networks embed relationships of 
power, arguing that greater network centrality leads to greater power in terms of access to 
resources and normative preferences. Additionally, critical studies of international 
development have longstanding and well-developed accounts of power inequalities in 
international aid relationships. Thus, a second key question is the extent to which the 
networks emerging from these partnerships reproduce or transform relationships of power in 
international development. Here, we look to see whether the network structure is more 
consistent with what one would expect in non-hierarchical decision making, or conversely 
whether the relationships would seem to preclude or hinder consensual decisions by 
inequalities in power and influence. 
We investigate these questions using social network analysis and an original dataset of 
memberships in partnerships for international development education. 
Methods and data 
Our primary data consist of accessible organisational membership lists in seven partnership-
based organisations. We selected these organisations because of their prominence in the field 
of educational development and included those that describe their structure as a partnership; 
include state and non-state representation and/or Northern and Southern participation; target 
education as a global issue impacting cross-border populations; and have the mandate to 
improve educational access and/or quality in the Global South. The partnerships, however, 
target a range of foci, including advocacy, financing, policy-design, knowledge-sharing, 
and/or program-development: 
 The Global Campaign for Education (GCE) with 107 members: The GCE is an 
advocacy organisation and is the largest consortium of civil society organizations 
globally, representing individual CSOs and regional civil society coalitions from 
the Global North and South (GCE 2017).  
 The Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) with 62 members: 
The INEE is a network of partner organizations from the state and non-state sector 
and across the Global North and South, and acts as a convening organization on 
the issue of education in emergencies. It operates in the areas of advocacy, 
knowledge mobilization, community building, and resource development (INEE 
2017). 
 The United Nations Girls Education Initiative (UNGEI) with 24 members: 
UNGEI is a multi-stakeholder partnership that joins state and non-state members 
from the Global North and South in order to advocate for equity within and 
improvement of education for girls (UNGEI 2017). 
 The Global Partnership for Education (GPE) with 92 members: As the largest 
multi-stakeholder partnership on education and a core funder of education 
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globally, members of GPE represent governments, the private sector, civil society, 
and multilaterals from the Global North and South (GPE 2017).  
 The United Nations Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) with 38 members: 
GEFI is a partnership initiated by the UN General Secretary that has 
organizational membership from the state and non-state sectors working as a 
forum for policy development, advocacy and outreach on educational access, 
quality, and global citizenship (GEFI 2017). 
 The Global Business Coalition for Education (GBC) with 33 members: The GBC 
is a consortium of members from the business community in the Global North and 
South. The partnership connects companies, fosters collaboration, communicates 
business initiatives on global education, and funds research (GBC 2017) 
 The International Working Group on Education (IWGE) with 8 members: IWGE 
is a partnership of foundations with educational mandates and aid agencies, 
housed within UNESCO’s International Institute for Educational Planning, 
working in the area of information exchange and publishing on topics such as aid 
coordination and education policy implementation (IWGE 2017). 
The membership of these partnership-based organisations comprises 293 organisations, with 
each organisation holding membership in between one and five partnerships. We classified 
the member organisations into seven different categories:  
 Civil Society or Non-Governmental Organisations (140 organisations) are directly 
involved in programme implementation in international development education, 
for example the Norwegian Refugee Council and Oxfam International. This 
category also includes advocacy campaigns and networks. Because this group is 
so large, we distinguish between those in Northern (83 organisations) and 
Southern (57 organisations) countries, using the classification described below. 
 Bilateral International Development Donors (24 organisations) for example the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) 
 International Organisations (14 total) are organisations whose members are 
nation-states (Beckfield 2010), for example the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) and the World Bank. The category includes multilateral development 
donors (e.g. UNDP and the European Commission)  
 Recipient National Governments (60 total), for example the governments of 
Tanzania, Bangladesh and Bolivia.  
 Private Foundations (7 total) includes any development donor that is not a 
national government but that has a primary purpose of funding other 
organisations, for example the Aga Khan Foundation and Open Society 
Foundation 
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 Private sector businesses (34 total), for example Accenture, Cisco and Chevron. 
 Universities and Research Institutes (14 total) for example the University of 
Sussex and the Brookings Institution. The focus of these organisations is research 
rather than programme implementation. 
For each organisation, we identified the location of its headquarters and matched this location 
with the four World Bank income classifications (i.e. low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and 
high). On this basis, we are able to identify the possibilities for South-South and North-South 
relationships advocated by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005, 18). Based on 
this classification, we designated actors as either ‘Northern’ (i.e. from a high or upper-middle 
income country) or ‘Southern’ (i.e. from a lower or lower-middle income country) with the 
understanding that these terms delineate broad socio-economic categories that encapsulate a 
great deal of diversity and variation. We explore the geospatial distribution of the ‘Northern’ 
and ‘Southern’ organisations using the Google Geocoding Application Programming 
Interface (API), which translates the text describing the location of the headquarters (for 
example, ‘Geneva, Switzerland’) to a geospatial coordinate (i.e. a latitude/longitude 
coordinate). 
From the lists of memberships, we created an affiliation network (Borgatti and Halgin 
2011)—a network in which the strength of a tie between two organisations is the number of 
common memberships they hold in the seven partnership-based organisations. Thus, if two 
organisations are both members in two common partnerships, the strength of the tie between 
them would be two. Similarly, if two organisations do not share membership in any 
partnership-based organisation, they are not connected to one another in the network. This 
approach to transforming common memberships into a social network is well-documented 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994; Borgatti and Halgin 2011), and affiliation networks have been 
studied in numerous contexts, including co-membership in corporate boards (Domhoff 1967), 
co-membership in international organisations (Beckfield 2010), and co-authorship of 
scientific articles (Newman 2004). 
The maximum theoretical strength of a tie between two organisations in the network is seven, 
which would be the case if two organisations were members of all seven partnerships. 
However, this did not occur the dataset, and would be problematic as it would represent a 
saturation of tie strength. Instead, most ties are either zero or one: 29,495 (69.8%) ties are 
absent (zero), meaning the organisations hold no common memberships in partnership-based 
organisations. In contrast, 12,646 (29.7%) ties are based on one co-membership, but only 282 
(0.66%) are ties are based on two or more common memberships. Therefore, for the purposes 
of analysis below, we use a binary version of the network, in which organisations are 
connected if they have at least one membership in common. Organisations without at least 
one common membership are not connected. This approach under-represents the strength of 
ties that are based on multiple co-memberships, but it allows the application of social 
network analysis methods developed for networks with binary ties (Borgatti and Halgin 
2011). 
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We analyse this network with methods for social network analysis (Wasserman and Faust 
1994), specifically focusing on measures of centrality and brokerage. Centrality refers to 
‘actors that are extensively involved in relationships with other actors’ (Wasserman and Faust 
1994, 173). While intuitively simple, formally defining and operationalizing centrality is 
challenging, and several measures of centrality are have been defined in social network 
analysis (Freeman 1978; Newman 2010). Our analysis uses two commonly employed 
measures of centrality: degree and eigenvector centrality. Degree centrality is simply a count 
of the ties to each actor in the network. In contrast, eigenvector centrality is premised on the 
idea that ‘not all connections are of equal value’ (Burris 2004, 251); therefore, an actor’s 
centrality is based upon not only the number of connections, but also weighted by the 
connected actors’ own centrality (Shields, 2016). In other words, a tie is worth more if it is 
from a highly connected actor. Finally, brokerage is defined as the extent to which an actor 
mediates connections between actors of two other types (Gould and Fernandez 1989). For 
example, if a bilateral donor were not directly connected to a CSO, but both were connected 
to a recipient government, that government would broker the connectivity between the donor 
and the CSO. 
We analyse the centrality and brokerage of organisations in the network as an outcome of the 
type of organisation and its national income, specifically testing the proposition that 
centrality and brokerage differ between Northern (i.e. higher GDP) and Southern (i.e. lower 
GDP) countries, when controlling for the type of organisation. We do so using linear 
regression models (Sheather 2009) in which the dependent variables are the actors’ degree 
centrality, eigenvector centrality, and brokerage.1 
Analysis 
We begin our analysis with a description of the network structure, after which we present 
three statistical models of centrality and brokerage in the partnership networks. We then 
conclude with exemplar cases that demonstrate the patterns established in the statistical 
models. 
The network structure 
The educational partnership network includes a range of organisational types that span the 
state and non-state sectors. Traditionally prominent aid actors, namely state-based funders 
and recipients, are represented in the network with 24 bilateral donor agencies, 14 
multilateral organisations, and 60 recipient governments. The network membership, however, 
signifies the growth of non-state actors participating in the global education policy landscape, 
with numerous civil society organisations—140, the most of any organisational type in the 
network—as well as 34 private businesses and seven private foundations. Fourteen 
universities and research institutes are also included in the network. Purely based on 
numerical counts, the network shows an expansion of representation beyond the traditional 
aid structure, with strong participation from the non-state sector. 
                                                 
1 All data and files used in the analysis are available under an open source license at: https://osf.io/z3n49/ 
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[Figure 1 - Valued Sociogram] 
FIGURE 1: A sociogram of network actors. Actor positions are determined using the 
Fruchtermann-Reingold algorithm (1991), which positions connected actors close 
together to minimize crossing lines. The plot demonstrates large clusters of actors that 
are members of one partnership only. These clusters are connected by a smaller subset 
of mediators, many of which are NGOs. 
The network sociogram (Figure 1) represents organisations as points in a two-dimensional 
space, with groups of interconnected organisations plotted closely together. The plot indicates 
there are several groups of interconnected actors, but also shows that most clusters are 
heterogeneous (i.e. composed of different types of actors). The clustering also indicates that 
many actors share a common level of centrality; those that are clustered are not highly 
central. Many are members of one network only and most have intermediate levels of 
centrality. A smaller group of actors visibly mediates connections between these clusters, 
visualized as not only central in the network, but also acting as brokers to entities which 
would not otherwise be connected to one another. 
 [Figure 2A & B - WORLD MAPS] 
FIGURE 2: Geographic distribution of network actors plotted using the Google 
Geocoding API. The plot of locations (top) shows that actors are distributed over most 
regions of the world. However, the plot of network ties (bottom) shows that 
connections are unevenly distributed with many ties to Europe and North America 
with relatively few ties between the Southern countries. 
The geographic plot of organisation locations (Figure 2) shows that they represent a large 
geographic distribution. While there are concentrations of points (e.g. in Western Europe and 
the Northeastern United States), there are few populated areas that are completely 
unrepresented, and there is consistent representation throughout the Global South (e.g. Sub-
Saharan Africa).  Thus, there is an even distribution of members in the partnerships across the 
North and South, and if the network structure is egalitarian, one would what expect to also 
see an even distribution of ties. 
However, when connections are shown between the points (bottom plot) there is a much 
higher density of connections in the Global North than elsewhere. Numerous connections are 
visible between Western Europe and North America, where most international organizations 
and Northern bilateral agencies have their headquarters. There is little evidence of South-
South connectivity, as there are few connections neither across Sub-Saharan Africa nor 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world. Most connections go North-South or 
North-North, and few lines cross over the Southern hemisphere. 
Centrality and brokerage 
We computed centrality and brokerage values for all organisations in the network (Butts 
2014). Mean centrality and brokerage values for each category of organisation and for each 
income classification are shown in Table 1. Results show that both bilateral donors and 
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Southern CSOs have high levels of both degree and eigenvector centrality, although Northern 
CSOs have higher levels of brokerage. Recipient governments, international organisations, 
and Northern civil society organisations have intermediate levels of centrality, with some 
variation between degree and eigenvector centrality, while universities and research 
institutes, private businesses and private foundations have the lowest levels of centrality.  
Table 1 also shows a common trend in network positionality across income classifications: 
values of degree centrality consistently decrease for higher income classifications. 
Eigenvector centrality and brokerage are more varied, although high-income countries have 
the lowest mean values for all measures. 
[TABLE 1] 
Table 1: Number of organisations, network centrality and brokerage by organisation 
type and national income classification. Values displayed are the mean standardized 
value (i.e. the z-value) across the entire organisation type or income grouping; thus 
for degree centrality, eigenvector centrality, and brokerage the mean value is zero. 
While results suggest clear differences in network positionality according to organisation 
type and national income, further analysis is needed because these two factors are 
interrelated. For example, bilateral donors are found mainly in upper-mid and high income 
countries, while Southern and Northern CSOs (by definition) are confined to low and high 
income classifications. Disaggregating the combined effects of organisation type and income 
is accomplished through linear regression models.  
Regression models 
We further tested the relationship between organisation type, national income, and network 
positionality (i.e. centrality and brokerage) using a linear regression model. In our model, the 
measures of centrality/brokerage are the dependent variable, while the national income and 
organisational classification are independent variables. The main advantage of the linear 
model is that it independently tests the relationship of income and organisational 
classification. This independence is important because organisational classifications are not 
evenly distributed across national incomes. Rather, certain types of organisation are more 
commonly associated with high- and low-income contexts, making it difficult to identify the 
effects of organisation type and income from the mean values in Table 1. 
The linear model disaggregates the influence of organisational type and national income in 
order to better understand how each one relates to the network positionality independently. A 
second function of the linear model is to test the statistical significance of the independent 
variables. While this test relates to the generalisability of a sample to the population, it also 
relates to the overall levels of confidence in the validity of findings, treating the observed 
population as a sample from a ‘superpopulation’ of conceivable alternatives (Goldstein 
2015). 
To provide a better test of the relationship between national income and network 
positionality, we replace the World Bank income classifications used in Table 1 with the 
14 
GDP per capita for each country, taken as an average of the years 2010-2015. By replacing 
categories with a continuous variable, we are able to represent the full spectrum of national 
income in our model. Because the distribution of GDP is highly skewed, we use a logarithmic 
transformation in our model. To represent the differences between organisations we use 
dummy-coding, treating the organisations that were least central in Table 1 (i.e. ‘private 
business’) as a reference category with an implicit value of zero. The reported effects of other 
categories are then relative to the reference. 
[TABLE 2] 
TABLE 2: Regression analysis of centrality and brokerage as an outcome of 
organisation type and national GDP. Private business is a reference category (i.e. an 
implicit value of zero), relative to which all other organisations are compared.  
Overall, results (Table 2) show significant relationships between different organisation types 
and network positionality. The strongest and most consistent finding across all three 
measures is that bilateral donors occupy central positions in the network: they are connected 
to more actors (degree centrality), their connections are more central themselves (eigenvector 
centrality) and they mediate connections between different types of organisation (brokerage). 
The regression analysis also shows that controlling for income (GDP), Northern and Southern 
CSOs are quite similar in their network positionality. They are both well-connected (high 
centrality), but do not broker ties between diverse groups of actors. International 
organisations are also moderately central and have significantly higher levels of brokerage 
than any type of organisation except bilateral donors. As with the results in Table 1, 
universities, private foundations, and private businesses are far more peripheral in the 
network structure than other actors. 
The association between GDP and network positionality is not consistent, there is a 
significant association with eigenvector centrality but no clear theoretical explanation for this 
specific difference. Rather demonstrating a significant difference in network positionality for 
organisations in North and South, the most important function of GDP in the model is to 
control for differences in income that are implicit in the organisation type. Thus, by 
disaggregating GDP from the type of organisation, international organisations (mostly with 
headquarters in high-income countries) are more central, whereas the difference between 
Northern and Southern CSOs diminishes when income is taken into account. Thus, the GDP 
term in the model makes it possible to assess the differences across organisations with 
income essentially treated as constant. 
Results also show that the model explains a high proportion of the variance in degree and 
eigenvector centrality (with adjusted r2 of 0.28 and 0.50, respectively). However, the variance 
explained by brokerage is relatively low (adjusted r2 = 0.13), meaning that the tendency of 
organisations to connect organisations of other types (who are otherwise unconnected) is not 
very well-explained by our models. Two explanations for these findings are possible. The 
first is that brokerage is explained by variables other than those considered in our analysis, 
for example the organisation’s size or age. Alternatively, the findings could indicate that 
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brokerage is randomly distributed among actors in the network, meaning that the brokering 
connections between different types of organisations is not particularly important in 
partnerships. To the extent that brokerage is explained, bilateral donors and international 
organisations are identified as the most likely organisations to bridge different types of actors. 
Exemplar cases 
The analysis identifies two key patterns in partnership networks. First, the structure of the 
network is closely related to resource flows in aid relationships, specifically the connections 
between donors and recipients. Second, the non-state sector’s role is notable, but the nature of 
participation differs for CSOs and private actors. Here, we provide illustrative examples in 
order to contextualise these results. 
Bilateral donors 
Many of the most central organisations are bilateral aid donors. For example, the UK’s 
Department for International Development (DfID), Norway’s NORAD, and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) all have high values (ranked 2nd, 3rd and 4th) 
in their eigenvector centrality. These agencies are members of five different partnerships, 
which connect them to a large number of other organisations. Australia’s AUSAID, 
Denmark’s DANIDA, Germany’s GIZ, and Sweden’s SIDA, all bilateral donors, are also 
among the ten most central actors. The least central bilateral donors are China and Croatia, 
which are jointly ranked 245th (equally) in eigenvector centrality, and members of only one 
partnership. These cases suggest that donors with higher centrality measures, in particular 
agencies in the top ten for centrality measures, are greater providers of international aid, 
committing larger budgets to overseas development assistance than those with lower values 
(OECD 2016). 
Aid recipients 
Although low and lower-middle income countries are strongly represented in the network 
(second only to CSOs in number), the analysis shows that recipient governments are less 
likely to hold central positions in partnership networks. The four most central recipients 
(Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Guyana, and Mozambique) are all members of the same two 
partnerships (GPE and UNGEFI), and are therefore jointly ranked as 115th in centrality. 
Southern countries are not strongly connected to one another, as their connections primarily 
go South-to-North (see Figure 2B). Combined with the very high centrality measures of 
donors, these results indicate that aid recipients hold peripheral positions. As shown in Figure 
2B’s visualization of global connections, countries in the Global South—the location of aid 
recipients—are predominantly connected to the network via the North-Eastern United States 
and Western Europe, where most bilateral donors have their headquarters. Based on literature 
on international networks, these findings suggest that aid recipients are less likely to 




Civil society organisations 
Our analysis shows that civil society organisations are the most widely represented 
organisational type in the network, accounting for 140 of the 293 total entities. The high 
centrality of both Northern and Southern CSOs illustrates the changing nature of the 
education aid environment, which historically included primarily governments and 
multilaterals. Many of the most central organisations are CSOs in high-income countries, 
such as Plan International (the most central organisation in the analysis), Oxfam and Save the 
Children (jointly 5th). However, many CSOs in Southern countries are also very central, such 
as the Africa Network Campaign for Education for All (ANCEFA), and Forum for African 
Women Educationalists (FAWE), both of which are among the 20 most central organisations.  
Non-central organisations: Private actors and research institutes 
The models also identify types of organisations than tend to have low integration into the 
partnership network. Private businesses are notably non-central; among the least central 
organisations (tied 245th) are Chevron, Exxon, Credit Suisse McKinsey and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, all of which are only members of the business-oriented GBC. The 
latter two results are somewhat surprising, given the increasing role of private sector 
consultancies in implementing key international development programmes (e.g. Barber 2013; 
DFID 2012; DFID 2016). 
Universities and research institutes are also peripheral, with none above 190th in centrality. 
All 14 universities and research institutes are located in high-income countries. Of all 
Universities, only one (University of Toronto - the most central University) is a member of 
more than one partnership. A common theme in most non-central organisations is that aid 
flows are relatively unimportant to their key concerns and core activities. In other words, 
these organisations are neither aid resource-dependent nor significant providers of 
international finance, and they therefore have little incentive to actively pursue integration 
into partnership networks.  
Exceptions and outliers  
Results also show that the groups presented above can conceal important individual actors 
that differ from the overall trend. For example, Intel Corporation, LEGO Education, 
Microsoft and Pearson are all private companies with high centrality values relative to other 
businesses. As members of both GPE and GBC they are jointly ranked 121st, each with 
distinctive and different motivations and histories that could explain why its engagement is 
greater than other companies. The Open Society Foundation (ranked 113th) is much more 
engaged in the network than other private foundations, for example Aga Khan Foundation 
(195th), Comic Relief (196th), and the Qatar Foundation (245th). In other cases, outliers are 
less central in the network than one might expect. For example, UNDP—a major multilateral 
agency—is a member of only one partnership (GEFI), and has a correspondingly low 
centrality value (245th). 
17 
Discussion 
Our study offers two primary contributions to the literature. First, we map the emerging 
constellations of actors engaged in global partnerships for educational development. Our 
mapping supports the claim that international development is in a phase of ‘hypercollectivity’ 
characterized by a diverse group of organisations that engage with one another through a 
complex pattern of relationships. Most of these heterogeneous partnerships demonstrate a 
shift away from state-based organisations (i.e. government donors, recipients, and 
international organisations). For example, civil society organisations in both the North and 
South are particularly numerous, indicative of their expanding participation in global 
education policy-making (Menashy 2016; Mundy and Murphy 2001; Mundy 2012). Though 
less numerous, private companies, private foundations, and universities all demonstrate the 
noteworthy and growing involvement of non-state organisations in international 
development. 
Second, we analyse how actors’ connections to one another represent power within the 
network of partnerships for international development education. Our analysis shows that the 
structure of the network reproduces power relationships that predate the discursive shift to 
partnership. Specifically, bilateral donors are the most central organisations in the partnership 
network, while recipient countries are relatively peripheral. International organisations—
including multilateral organisations—have high centrality and are more likely to broker 
connections between different types of actors than other organisations. In conjunction with 
the literature on international networks (Hafner-Burton, et al. 2009), these findings suggest 
that donors and international organisations are likely to shape the flows of information, ideas, 
and normative preferences of these partnerships. Despite the emergence of hypercollectivity 
with a rhetorical emphasis on ‘non-hierarchical modes of steering’ (Risse 2004, 292), the 
structure of the partnership network tends to reflect the established relationships and roles of 
international aid. 
Evidence on the power of non-state actors in the network shows heterogeneity and 
segmentation. On the one hand, civil society organisations in both the North and South are 
very numerous and highly central, their network positionality enables advocacy and influence 
that simultaneously and ambiguously combine the neo-liberal preference for non-state actors 
in development with grassroots activism and democratic participation (Kamat 2004). On the 
other hand, the involvement of the private sector and universities seems relatively superficial 
and is likely to carry little influence. In terms of businesses and foundations, their marginal 
status in the network may be indicative of a wider lack of financial support from the private 
sector (van Fleet 2011), which sees investments in education as difficult to track (Menashy 
2016) despite high-profile calls to increase private funding (Brown 2015; Rose and Steer 
2014; Sachs 2015).  It seems unlikely that the structure of partnership networks alone can 
explain the minimal levels private sector funding when compared to other sectors. A better 
explanation is that the peripheral status of the private sector is symptomatic of a larger lack of 
engagement in the education sector. The private companies have an ‘exit option’ in that 
international educational development does not constitute part of their core activities and is 
only minimally required in order to maintain some levels of legitimacy. In the context of 
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declining bilateral aid to education (GEM 2016), our results suggest that the network of 
partnerships needs the private sector more than the private sector needs to be part of the 
network.  
Limitations 
While contributing new insights to the literature, there are certain important limitations to our 
study. First, by taking co-memberships as our unit of analysis, the analysis focuses more on 
conduits of connectivity than the substance of interactions between organisations. Thus, ties 
delineate potential flows of information (and potential blockages) rather than actual 
engagement or interactions. While the study of co-membership networks is well-established 
(Borgatti and Halgin 2011), co-membership should not be conflated with the presence or 
substance of interactions. In this context, an analysis of the latter phenomenon would likely 
require prolonged qualitative investigation. Similarly, our evidence in differences of 
centrality and brokerage across different types of organizations should not be used to draw 
conclusions about particular organizations, which may be well-served by their partnerships. 
Second, our sample of partnerships is limited due to the emerging nature of the field, and as a 
result structural differentiation within the network is limited. In other words, many actors are 
members of one partnership only, and their positionality cannot be differentiated from other 
actors who are only members of the same partnership. As seen in Figure 1, the positionality 
of these actors is largely determined by the comparatively small number of actors who do 
engage across multiple partnerships. Finally, our analysis is cross-sectional rather than 
longitudinal. Those who support the shift towards partnerships would likely argue that this 
approach has not removed power inequalities but has rather decreased them over time. This is 
an interesting empirical question, and in this respect our study and data may serve as a 
possible foundation for future research. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis indicates that partnerships formed following the Paris Declaration introduce a 
great diversity of actors in international development education, many of which are relatively 
new to the sector. However, it is important not to associate this collectivity with 
egalitarianism; using social network analysis, we argue that the shift towards partnership 
perpetuates rather than transforms power relationships in international development 
education. In particular, donors maintain a position within the network that suggests they 
would maintain the greatest influence over both the resource flows and normative preferences 
of partnerships. These networks also demonstrate the strong influence of civil society 
organisations in both the North and South and provide evidence that private sector actors are 
minimally engaged in the field. 
Relationships between different organisations in international development—and in particular 
the role of the private sector—are longstanding concerns of comparative education research 
(Mathew 1970). To this body of literature, our research demonstrates the utility of the social 
network approach as a way to understand and analyse power inequalities in international 
development. The identification of hegemony in relationships that are presented as apolitical 
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or non-hierarchical is a key theme of critical studies of international development (Colclough 
and Webb 2012; Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1990; Verger et al 2014). It is therefore less 
surprising that inequalities exist than that these inequalities are so readily observable in the 
network structure, and that the analysis is able to clearly distinguish how different types of 
actors are integrated into the network. The study therefore supports the findings of policy 
analyses, country case studies, and ethnographic research that expose North-South power 
asymmetries and the concentration of power within Northern organisations (see Ball 2012; 
Chabbott 2003; Draxler 2008; Kamat 2004; Vavrus and Seghers 2010; Verger et al 2014), 
using a quantitative empirical approach. 
Additionally, our study contributes to research on privatisation and the political economy of 
aid. Literature has demonstrated that private actors are increasingly involved in international 
education networks (Ball 2012), and our exploration of those participating in these networks 
empirically confirms a significant presence of the private sector. However, our analysis 
shows that the integration of the private sector is relatively weak. To explain these results, we 
argue that private actors have an ‘exit option.’ For instance, businesses are less dependent on 
network integration for their core activities and revenue, and in this respect they differ from 
other organisations involved in partnerships. In most cases, private businesses’ primary 
benefit from the partnerships is to achieve and maintain normative legitimacy. 
While this study demonstrates several key characteristics of partnership networks, it is far 
from a final analysis of the networks involved in international educational development. A 
foundational assumption of the network approach is that actors form relationships 
intentionally and strategically. In this respect, one can expect that organisations involved in 
aid to education and global education policy will continue to reshape the network in response 
to a continually changing strategic environment. The processes and dynamic aspects of the 
network evolution will yield important and unique insights into the political, economic and 
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Figure 1: Valued Sociogram 
 













Table 1: Number of organisations, network centrality and brokerage 
 N Degree Eigenvector Brokerage 
Organization Type     
Bilateral Donor 24 1.028 0.574 1.157 
Civil Society Org. (North) 83 -0.008 0.122 0.019 
Civil Society Org. (South) 57 0.444 1.011 -0.261 
International Org. 14 -0.141 -0.618 0.553 
Private Business 34 -1.087 -1.262 -0.154 
Private Foundation 7 -0.357 -0.636 -0.059 
Recipient Government 60 0.030 -0.217 -0.214 
University/Research Org. 14 -0.692 -0.895 -0.269 
 
Income Classification 
    
Low 47 0.264 0.353 -0.220 
Lower-mid 69 0.184 0.373 -0.247 
Upper-mid 34 0.131 0.397 -0.019 




Table 2: Regression analysis of centrality and brokerage as an outcome 
of organisation type and national GDP 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Degree Eigenvector Brokerage 
































































Observations 291 291 291 
r2 0.30 0.51 0.15 
Adjusted r2 0.28 0.50 0.13 
Residual Std. Error 0.85 0.71 0.94 
F Statistic 14.87** 37.18** 6.45** 
Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01; 
 
